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Abstract
We explain how to design RISC-V shellcodes capable of running
arbitrary code, whose ASCII binary representation use only letters
a–zA–Z, digits 0–9, and either of the three characters: #, /, ’.
1 Introduction
RISC-V [22] is a new Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) which development
began in 2010. It is based on the concept of Reduced Instruction Set Com-
puter (RISC) [17], targeting simplicity by providing few and limited com-
puter instructions. RISC ISAs have become increasingly popular with the
wide adoption of embedded devices such as smartphones, tablets, or other
Internet of Things devices. The most popular RISC ISAs are currently
ARM [1], Atmel AVR [2], MIPS [16], Power [11], and SPARC [21].
RISC-V is the fifth RISC ISA published by UC Berkeley. It is com-
pletely free and open-source, with its User-Level ISA published in May 2017
in version 2.2. It features 32-bit and 64-bit little-endian variants (desig-
nated as RV32 and RV64), with a future extension to 128-bit. While only
test boards feature RISC-V processors for now, many companies including
Western Digital or Nvidia have announced the use of RISC-V chips in their
future products [19].
This increasing popularity makes RISC-V an attractive target for low-
level attackers, whose tools are traditionally honed chiefly against x86 plat-
forms. This is exacerbated by the widespread adoption of smartphones and
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their use for almost any task from payment to dating to unlocking one’s car,
making successful attacks especially profitable. At the same time, mobile
environments are improving their security, in part to address such threats.
Nevertheless, mobile applications are still occasionally vulnerable to mem-
ory safety vulnerabilities, and the need for performance or obfuscation often
drives developers to implement low-level (e.g., JNI) segments which are par-
ticularly susceptible to the usual techniques of buffer overflow exploitation.
Unlike traditional local or network scenarios however, the attacker has only
limited ways to transmit a payload.
We claim that a reasonable vector is text-based applications, which in-
cludes SMS, social networks, chat applications (in a remote context), pass-
word entry, note taking, or QR code scanning (in a local context). This
being said, the attacker’s payload has to be treated by this application as
text such as a hashtag, a URL, a sentence, in the most restrictive sense, hence
the most widely applicable. We therefore consider alphanumeric programs
whose binary representation use only the alphanumeric ASCII characters:
the 52 lowercase and uppercase letters of the English alphabet and the 10
digits. As we will discuss, it is only possible to achieve arbitrary code ex-
ecution at the cost of allowing one additional character: either #, /, or ’,
each being compatible with the use-cases discussed above.
1.1 Prior and related work
This work follows a trend initiated in the early 2000s to evade buffer over-
flow protections (Eller [10] and RIX [20] on x86) and intrusion detection
systems [12]. Tools to generate alphanumeric shellcodes on the x86 plat-
form appeared [4] and are now a standard component of attack frameworks
including Metasploit (msfvenom) and UPX1. The x86 is particularly well
suited to this exercise as many letters materialize into mov instructions,
which form a Turing-complete subset of operations [8]. To this day however
neither of these tools are able to generate alphanumeric shellcodes on ARM
platforms, such as ARMv8 and RISC-V.
The first automated tool was provided by Younan et al. in 2011 for
the ARMv5 platform, relying on an BF interpreter and bytecode [23]. The
technique however does not carry over to more recent implementations. In
2016, Barral et al. introduced the first tool capable of compiling arbitrary
ARMv8 code into alphanumeric executable code [3]. This is a tour de force
but also and most importantly it introduces a generic approach to design
such tools.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, none of the currently available
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approaches works on RISC-V.
1.2 Our contribution
We provide, as far as the authors know, the first analysis of alphanumeric
code on RISC-V, as well as a complete framework for automatically gen-
erating alphanumeric (+1 character) shellcodes. Through a three-staged
modular design, these shellcodes achieve arbitrary code execution on this
platform.
This is the second architecture which can be addressed using the method-
ology from [3], which is an argument in favor of such generic approaches
(rather than ad hoc ones). Our approach differs on the fact that we do
not manually assemble available instructions into higher-level constructs for
building the unpacker in a bottom-up fashion and instead opt for a par-
tially automated strategy to generate the required alphanumeric instruction
sequences to achieve the desired results.
We provide three different constructions, corresponding to each choice
of an additional character. All our programs are given in appendix, being to
the best of the authors’ knowledge the first automated tool of this kind for
RISC-V, as well as the first examples of such shellcodes for each construction.
2 Background
2.1 Shellcodes and exploitation
In a typical arbitrary code execution (ACE) scenario, attackers can run a
relatively short program of their choosing. It is called a shellcode, as it can
start a shell session, which in turn allows attackers to download and run
additional programs.
For instance, a stack overflow ACE can happen when an application
allows writing in an array beyond the allocated space for this array, resulting
in overwriting stack frame data. In platforms such as x86 the stack frame
stores information about the instruction pointer before a call; by overwriting
this information an attacker can control the instruction pointer and send it
back to the array’s address. The array’s contents are then executed as if they
were the vulnerable program’s own instructions: this is where the shellcode
is written.
Since a typical array is relatively short, shellcodes must accordingly be
concise. Similarly, an application may restrict what data it manipulates
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(e.g., strings) and shellcodes must be written to comply with such con-
straints. Additional protections make shellcode design trickier: Address
Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), stack-smashing protections, or non-
executable stack space for instance. Detection mechanisms may furthermore
identify characteristic aspects of a shellcode and prevent the attack from
reaching the target application. For all these reasons the modern shellcode
designer has to navigate around layers of obstacles.
This difficulty is somewhat offset on embedded and mobile devices, where
many protections are only partially implemented, if at all. Such platforms
are also host to many third-party applications, that can be developed with-
out strictly adhering to secure coding practices, using memory-unsafe lan-
guages (sometimes due to performance or obfuscation constraints) and not
necessarily updated in a timely fashion.
2.2 The RISC-V instruction set
RISC-V splits its instruction set between a mandatory core set (RV64I) and
different optional extensions, each of which is designated by a string (a single
letter for the most common ones), among which integer multiplication and
division (M), atomic operations (A), single-, double- or quad-precision (F, D, Q)
floating-point operations, decimal floating-point operations (L), compressed
instructions (C), vector operations (V).
The general purpose ISA, which includes IMAFD, is designated by the
letter G. In what follows, we focus on the RV64GC ISA, which is the one
agreed on by Debian and Fedora porters, as well as members of the RISC-V
Foundation. On top of that, the Foundation intends to provide “a pro-
file for standard RISC-V Unix platforms that will include C extension as
mandatory” [7].
The RV64GC ISA features 32-bit and 16-bit instructions, aligned on 16
bits. There are 31 general purpose 64-bit registers (x1-x31), 32 floating-point
registers (f0-f31), a program counter (pc), as well as various control-and-
status registers. The pseudo-register x0 designates the zero constant.
We adopt for the rest of this paper some terminology defined by the
RISC-V Instruction Set Manual, Version 1.10 [22]. Assembly instructions
are written in the format add x1,x2,x3, where add is called the opcode,
and x1, x2, x3 are the operands. Precisely, x1 is the destination register, x2
is the first source register and x3 is the second source register. When one
of the source registers is replaced by a constant, it is called an immediate.
To those conventions, let K be a register, we add our slicing notation as
K[y : x] (with x < y), meaning we take a slice of bits x to y of K, with the
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lowest bit denoted as the bit 0.
RISC-V ELF psABI specification [6] provides a register naming conven-
tion, reproduced in Table 1.
Register ABI Mnemonic Meaning
x0 zero Zero
x1 ra Return address
x2 sp Stack pointer
x3 gp Global pointer
x4 tp Thread pointer
x5-x7 t0-t2 Temporary registers
x8-x9 s0-s1 Callee-saved registers
x10-x17 a0-a7 Argument registers
x18-x27 s2-s11 Callee-saved registers
x28-x31 t3-t6 Temporary registers
f0-f7 ft0-ft7 Temporary registers
f8-f9 fs0-fs1 Callee-saved registers
f10-f17 fa0-fa7 Argument registers
f18-f27 fs2-fs11 Callee-saved registers
f28-f31 ft8-ft11 Temporary registers
Table 1: Naming convention for registers, per psABI [6].
3 Alphanumeric RISC-V
The first step towards building an alphanumeric shellcode for RV64GC con-
sists in generating the subset of alphanumeric valid instructions, which we
denote by αRV64GC. For this purpose, we generated every 16-bit and 32-
bit alphanumeric sequence, and tentatively disassembled it using objdump.
Per RISC-V Instruction Set Manual, 16-bit instructions must have their two
least significant bits set to 00, 01 or 10. Similarly, 32-bit instructions must
have their five least significant bits set to bbb11, with bbb different from
111.
Furthermore, some opcodes may encode invalid or unimplemented in-
structions. For instance, the little-endian word 7OOT corresponds to a load
upper immediate (lui), whereas WOOT does not correspond to any valid
RV64GC instruction, although its least significant bits are those of a valid
32-bit instruction:
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7OOT 0x374f4f54 lui t5 ,0 x544f4
WOOT 0x574f4f54 undefined
After filtering out all invalid sequences, we regroup the remaining in-
structions according to their opcode, providing an overview of the available
instructions for which there are some operands making them alphanumeric.
The internal structure of the instruction defines the main constraints on
the alphanumeric language subset. Each 32-bit instruction has its opcode
encoded in the first 7 bits of the first byte. Requiring the first byte to be
alphanumeric will therefore greatly reduce the available opcodes, while pro-
viding a wide range of operands for each opcode. On the contrary, 16-bit
instructions are more entropic in their spread. Henceforth, more opcodes
are available, with less operands for each opcode. Consequently, the expres-
siveness of αRV64GC relies on the intelligent combination of instructions of
various lengths.
Hereafter, we provide a review of those instructions, by explaining their
semantics and some insight on the available operands. For simplicity and
following the methodology introduced by Barral et al. in [3], we cluster
instructions as control-flow, data processing, and memory manipulation in-
structions.
3.1 Data processing
Data processing includes every instruction that does not modify the memory
or the program counter. Two variants may be available for each instruction,
either operating on the usual 64-bit registers or performing the operation
on 32 bits and sign-extending the result to the 64-bit register. Using 32-bit
variants for pointer manipulation prevents from reaching addresses ranging
from 0x8000 0000 to 0xFFFF FFFE FFFF FFFF. This is a serious caveat for
bare-metal shellcodes — as existing boards often have the DRAM start at
0x8000 0000 — forcing us to use the 64-bit variant. Hereafter, we only
present the most useful ones, omitting instructions which may have odd
effects (like micro-architectural hints for branch predictors):
• The addition addi instruction enables adding or removing only some
specific values multiple of 16 to sp. Its 32-bit signed variant addiw is
also available, and allows increasing or decreasing registers a0, a2, a4,
a6, s0, s2, sp, t1, and tp by a value ranging from −20 to 30.
• The instruction li, allows loading signed integers (ranging from −20
to 30) into registers sp, tp, s0, s2, s4, s6, s8, s10, t1, t3, t5, a0, a2,
a4, and a6. We use the letter S to designate this set of registers.
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Loading immediates to registers may also be done with the lui instruc-
tion (load upper immediate), which loads a 20-bit signed immediate
into the bits 31-12 of a register in S. The lowest bits are all set to
zero, while the 32 highest bits are computed as the sign-extension of
the immediate. We counted 238,791 alphanumeric lui instructions,
with a large choice of immediates.
• Bitwise manipulation: only the sra (shift right arithmetical) instruc-
tion is available, with all registers of S as source and destination, and
registers s3–s7 as shift amount.
• Floating-point operations: many useful floating-point operations are
available in αRV64GC, in simple, double and quad precision. Among
them we find sign manipulation like fabs (absolute value) or multiply-
accumulate fmadd and its variants (r ← ±a× b± c).
• Control-status register manipulation: many instructions available, such
as csrc, csrci, csrrc, csrrci, csrrsi, csrrwi, csrwi, not detailed
here. As privileged access may be required, we preferred not using
them and instead use the other available data processing instructions.
3.2 Control-flow instruction
Both conditional and unconditional jump instructions are available. For
unconditional branching, we have both j (jump) and jal (jump and link)
available, with the possibility to link any register of S. Conditional branches
are also available, with a wide variety of branching conditions: bgtz, ble,
bleu, blez, blt, bltu. No backward jump is available, as the immediate
offset has its sign set on the highest bit of a byte (hence always equal to
zero when alphanumeric). This may prevent the Turing completeness of
αRV64GC, as no unbounded computation mechanism is available without
additional assumptions, such as code-reuse or self-modifying code.
3.3 Memory processing
We have both 32-bit lw and 64-bit ld loads as well as double-precision
floating-point fld loads. However, no stores are available, which makes it
impossible to write arbitrary shellcodes: we are only able to modify the
registers and not the machine’s memory state.
This turns out to be a strong limitation as for instance the shellcode
designer cannot build paths (such as "/bin/sh") in memory (this is not an
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alphanumeric string). Thus, additional assumptions must be made, either
by finding gadgets able to write to memory or by reusing memory previously
set to the desired value at a known position (e.g., an environment variable).
Either option seems unsuitable in the context of a self-contained shellcode.
We therefore consider the possibility of allowing one non-alphanumeric
character — a choice which may be governed by operational constraints as
well. Among all ASCII-printable instructions modifying memory, only three
non alphanumeric characters stand out: slash /, hash #, and tick ’.
• Adding the hash character # gives standard 32-bit sw and 64-bit sd
store instructions. The 32-bit store sw provides the ability to store
almost any variable to various addresses with offsets multiple of 32.
Given that there is no possibility to increment a 64-bit register by less
than 16 (using addi), many memory areas are out of reach. The 64-
bit variant sd seems more promising: indeed, the available offsets are
only 2 bytes apart. Using this, we can efficiently store data by using
addi increments for coarse-grained pointer manipulation and reaching
the exact store address (up to a precision of 2 bytes) by tweaking the
offset of sd.
• Adding the slash character / provides some atomic instructions, such
as 32-bit and 64-bit atomic read-modify-write variants of binary con-
junction amoand and disjunction amoor. As an example, amoor.d
t1,s5,(sp) loads 64 bits from the address in sp into t1, and stores
in the same address the disjunction of t1 and s5. Note that the ad-
dresses passed to atomic operations must be naturally aligned, which
adds further complexity when designing our shellcode.
• Adding the tick character ’ provides floating-point store instructions
fsd, fsq, fsw. Controlling the stored values requires deep technical
knowledge of floating-point binary representation, as the associated
data manipulation operations are of the form ±a× b± c (e.g., fmadd,
fmsub).
For each of these three characters, we define a new subset of RV64GC, denoted
respectively #RV64IC, /RV64IAC and ’RV64IDC. The following section details
how we can achieve ACE in #RV64IC, setting up the stage and much of the
machinery for shellcodes in /RV64IAC and ’RV64IDC as well. Since these
require additional work, they are discussed later on.
8
4 High-level design
Several approaches can be used to run arbitrary code from an instruction-
limited shellcode. The main techniques available are: virtualization, compi-
lation, and packing.
Virtualization, as used by Younan et al. for 32-bit ARMv7 alphanumeric
shellcoding [23], requires the design of a bytecode and an interpreter, both
compatible with the limited instruction set, and powerful enough to mount a
realistic attack — beyond Turing-completeness, we need to perform system
calls or other mechanisms to evade the virtual environment. Virtualization
presents a huge runtime overhead as well as a committed engineering effort.
Compilation, when applicable, is very efficient: compilers such as mov-
fuscator [8, 9] and higher subleq [14] have been provided for one instruction
set computers, reduced ISA subsets made of only one instruction. However,
such methods are not applicable to αRV64GC as they often rely on syntax-
directed translation schemes. Here, the heavy constraints in αRV64GC on
the instruction operands hinders such methods that systematically trans-
late each grammar symbol into the target language. Furthermore, writing
compilers is in itself a daunting task. Perhaps for these reasons, to the best
of our knowledge, no work on compilation for alphanumeric shellcoding has
been published.
Packing is the third method, and by far the most common approach
in shellcoding. This typically results in multi-staged shellcodes, where one
stage decodes a second stage which is then executed. Packers can provide
additional functionalities such as encryption, which we do not explore here.
However, this technique requires the ability to execute self-modifying code,
which may be hindered by the presence of executable space protection mech-
anisms like DEP [15], PaX [18] or NX-bit [13]. Moreover, self-modifying
code raises cache issues which need to be handled on a target-specific basis.
We decided to follow this third approach: it is conceptually simpler,
much easier to check for correctness, and well suited to our target platform.
5 Detailed construction
In this section we show how to achieve arbitrary code execution, by de-
tailing each step of the #RV64IC version of the shellcode. Building on the
foundations laid with #RV64IC, we achieve similar results in /RV64IAC and
’RV64IDC.
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Stage 1
init
forward jump
encoded payload
Penc
Unpacker U1
Stage 2 U2
(unpacked by U1)
Figure 1: General structure of stage 1: an initialization section, with a
forward jump over the data-pool that contains the encoded final payload
Penc, and the unpacker U1. The location at which the stage 2 is unpacked
is highlighted in gray.
As explained in Section 4, we use a packing multi-staged design. We
present a three-stage approach:
• The first stage is a specific unpacker written in #RV64IC;
• The second is a general unpacker written in a slightly larger subset of
RV64IC;
• The third is our arbitrary payload.
The rationale for using three stages is governed by #RV64IC not containing
backjumps, therefore forcing us to unroll the decoding logic. This would
result in unwieldy large shellcodes if there were only two stages. Instead, we
use the first unpacker U1, whose structure is shown in Figure 1, to unpack
a minimal program U2 shown in Figure 2. The program U2 has backward
jumps and can therefore efficiently implement a decoder using a loop. U2
unpacks and execute the third stage, which is the payload P.
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Stage 2
init
main
decoding
loop
backward jump
jump
Stage 3
Payload
...
U2
Figure 2: General structure of stage 2: an initialization section, with a
loop decoding at each iteration one byte of the final payload P using two
bytes of the encoded payload Penc. It finally jumps to the decoded payload,
highlighted in gray.
5.1 Stage 1
U1 is an unpacker for the next stage. It is fully written in #RV64IC. As
no backward jumps are available, the unpacker is written as a straight-line
program.
Specifically, U1 must: (1) locate the shellcode and jump over the encoded
payload; (2) fix-up the store pointer; (3) unpack stage 2; (4) jump to the
decoded stage 2.
We achieve (4) simply by placing the decoded stage 2 immediately after
U1’s last instruction. The other steps are detailed below:
5.1.1 Locating the shellcode and jump over the encoded payload
To make the shellcode position independent, we find its absolute position in
memory using the jump and link (jal) instruction which stores the program
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counter to a user-specified register. This instruction consequently increases
the shellcode’s size by jumping over a large memory region. Yet, this area
is not entirely wasted, as we repurpose it to store our packed payload P.
5.1.2 Fixing-up the store pointer
The next step consists in setting up the register XI containing the address
at which we will write stage 2. For this purpose we use the absolute address
obtained in Section 5.1.1, to which we add a constant using several addi in-
structions. We must not forget the additional offset required when using the
sd store instruction in the decoder. Consequently, stage 2 will be unpacked
immediately after the shellcode.
The biggest immediate available for the addi instruction in αRV64GC is
464. Since the shellcode is much longer, we use the following trick: we first
append several addi XI, XI, 464 instructions until we exceed the desired
value. Then we replace some immediates in the sequence by the second
greatest available immediate, i.e. 448, which reduces the total sum, until
the desired value is reached.1 In this way, we are guaranteed to use the least
amount of addi instructions possible.
5.1.3 Unpacking stage 2
We then unpack stage 2 starting at XI+store_offset, where XI is the register
we set previously. This is done sequentially, using the sd instruction with
carefully chosen offsets. Indeed, we have many offsets only 2 bytes apart.
In our case, we chose a long chain of offsets (available from our constrained
instruction set), each exactly 2 bytes apart, 1920, 1922, ..., 1938. This allows
storing at most 20 consecutive bytes by first loading 2 bytes into a register
and then storing them into memory. We use a precomputed table providing
for each immediate the minimal sequence of instructions needed for loading
it to a given register. We explain below how to compute this table. To
store more than 20 bytes, we increment XI (using the addi XI, XI, 16
instruction) between each batch of 16 bytes, and continue with offsets 1924,
..., 1938. The whole stage 2 is 40 bytes long, unpacked in 3 batches of 20,
16, and 4 bytes.
The above strategy relies on a precomputed table of sequences for achiev-
ing arbitrary 2-byte loads. We generate this table using a depth-first search
strategy, by iterating over #RV64IC instruction sequences and storing the
1A small NOP sled of at most 16 bytes may be required for getting an exact match.
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reached values. This approach yields for each 2-byte immediate the shortest
sequence required to load it into a register.
More precisely, the first instruction of the sequence is a lui (loads an
immediate in bits 12 to 31 of the destination register). It is followed by
an arithmetical right-shift sra instruction (unless the shift amount is null).
By intersecting the set of possible registers which may be used both as
destination register for sd and lui, we end up with registers s4, s6, t1, tp.
As sra requires a register as a shift amount, we also iterate over all possible
load immediate li and addiw subsequences to get the desired shift amount.
The next instructions of the sequence are made of addiw instructions,
with immediates ranging from -20 to 30. We limit the exploration of the
instruction sequence space to at most 4 addiw instructions, to keep U1 com-
pact. This limitation still grants the possibility to load 63448 out of the
65536 possible values (or 96%) into s4, s6, t1, or tp.
In this way, we can design our stage 2 with a substantially expanded set
of available instructions. Indeed, we merely require to make sure every pair
of bytes in stage 2 could be loaded from an instruction sequence in the table.
5.2 Stage 2
Stage 2 (U2) is more straightforward. It consists of some initialization code
followed by a loop whose body decodes two consecutive bytes of Penc, the
encoded payload. The full implementation can be found in Appendix B. The
initialization code sets three registers — the reading pointer XP pointing to
the encoded payload, the writing pointer XQ pointing to the start of the
decoded payload, and the end pointer XS pointing to the end of the decoded
payload. For simplicity, U2 performs in-place decoding, meaning that XP is
initially equal to XQ.
We also flush the instruction cache with a fence.i instruction, which is
required as we modify executable memory. We discuss later in Section 6 the
assumption that the first fence.i is not shadowed in the instruction cache.
Since 63 characters are available, it is theoretically possible to encode
almost 6 bits of the payload in a single alphanumeric byte of the shellcode.
However, to keep U2 short, we decided to encode only 4 bits per alphanumeric
byte. This spreads each byte of the payload over 2 consecutive alphanumeric
characters. As stage 2 is unpacked sequentially by the first stage, we need
to make stage 2 the shortest possible, even if this makes the encoder more
complex. Indeed, any additional length here would lead to a significant
increase in stage 1 size. Let K be the byte stored at XP + 1, L the byte
stored at XP and A the byte written at address XQ by the store instruction.
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The decoding algorithm we devised only requires 5 instructions in the body
of its loop.
lw XS , 4(XP) # Load K and L bytes
# XS == 0x????K[4:7]K[0:3]L[4:7]L[0:3]
mv XT , XS # Duplicate value
srli XT , XT , 4 # Shift right by 4
# XT == 0x?????K[4:7]K[0:3]L[4:7]
xor XS , XS , XT # XS := XS ⊕ XT
# XS == 0x??????A[4:7]A[0:3]
sw XS , 0(XQ) # Store decoded byte A
Hereafter, we find the encoding formulae by solving the decoding equa-
tions. Henceforth, when encoding byte A, the encoder must find values for
K and L so that:
K and L are alphanumeric
L [0 : 3]⊕ L[4 : 7] = A[0 : 3]
K[0 : 3]⊕ L[4 : 7] = A[4 : 7]
One should remark that every byte of the form 0x4* or 0x6* for * non
null is alphanumeric. This simplifies the resolution of the previously given
constraints. The following solution can be checked to give an alphanumeric
encoding for any input byte.
L[4 : 7] = 0x4 if A[0 : 3] 6= 0x4 else 0x6
L[0 : 3] = A[0 : 3]⊕ L[4 : 7]
K[0 : 3] = A[4 : 7]⊕ L[4 : 7]
K[4 : 7] = 0x4 if A[0 : 3] 6= 0x0 else 0x5
Finally, as executable memory modifications occurred, we flush the in-
struction cache again using a fence.i instruction, and jump to the decoded
payload P.
5.3 Payload
Stage 3 is the payload P, containing arbitrary binary code. We generate
this code directly from a C source payload compiled with a standard gcc.
The resulting binary code is then encoded as described in Section 5.2 with
a lightweight PHP script.
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The size of the payload is upper bounded by the offset chosen for the
forward jump is Figure 1. For our needs, we deemed 1024 bytes to be suf-
ficient, allowing us a decoded payload of 512 bytes. Note that with some
minor engineering work, this maximum size can be increased. In the context
of usual shellcoding attacks, the payload almost always fits into this limit.
As a proof-of-concept, we test in Section 6 three different payloads for a stan-
dard Linux: a printf("Hello world") shellcode, an execve("/bin/sh")
shellcode, and one that leaks the contents of /etc/shadow.
5.4 Integration/Linking
All in all, the complete shellcode is built in the following order:
1. We compute the table of minimal instruction sequences (Section 5.1.3).
2. We build the final payload P, and compute its length (Section 5.3).
3. We generate stage 2, with the appropriate values for the reading
pointer, the writing pointer, and the end pointer (Section 5.2 and fig. 2).
4. We generate the unpacker for stage 2, and compute its length (Sec-
tion 5.1.3 and fig. 1).
5. We generate the code for fixing-up the store pointer (Section 5.1.2).
6. We then build the whole shellcode, without its encoded stage 3 pay-
load, for which we allocated the necessary space.
7. We finally insert the encoded payload P at the appropriate location
in the shellcode.
5.5 Shellcoding in /RV64IAC
We have also created a version of the shellcode in /RV64IAC, using atomic
store instructions instead of regular stores for unpacking in stage 1. Data is
stored with the amoor.d instruction which operates on 8 naturally aligned
bytes. By opposition to the previous implementation in #RV64IC, we do
not have offsets for stores, hence we need to modify the store pointer using
available addi instances, which can only increase a register by a multiple of
16. We thus store our decoded stage 2 in blocks of 16 bytes. As we have
control over only the 8 first bytes, we decided to split them into two parts,
the first four bytes containing the decoded instruction, whereas the next two
15
instruction nop-like jump to
next block
(unused)
0 2 4 6 · · · 16
Figure 3: Diagram of a 16-byte block. Our stage 2 instructions are located
in the first two bytes, while the next two contain a NOP like instruction
followed by a jump to the next block. The last 10 bytes are unused.
bytes contain a jump instruction to the next block (j .+0xc , or 0x31A0 in
hexadecimal). The structure of the block is shown in Figure 3.
As required by the sequences for 2-byte arbitrary load computed in
Section 5.1.3, we wrote stage 2 using only compressed instructions. The
only exception is fence.i, which is unavoidable and does not have a com-
pressed version. In this case, we use a custom sequence to store its value
(0x0000100F in hexadecimal). We would like to particularly thank the au-
thors of RISC-V for the fact that the 16 highest bits of fence.i are all
zeros, which keeps our sequence of instructions really short. Otherwise we
would have required chaining many addi instructions, making the shellcode
too long to be used in practice.
The sequences used for loading the 2-byte instructions are computed
using a table similar to that of Section 5.1.3. By opposition to #RV64IC,
here the word’s two highest bytes will be executed as an instruction. We
make sure that these two bytes do not modify the high-level semantics of the
program. Altogether, the table allows loading 58174 possible 16-bit values,
out of 65536 (or 88%) which still allows encoding our stage 2 with only
minor modifications, at the expense of a slight size increase of only 2 bytes.
The payload and the way it is encoded remains identical.
5.6 Shellcoding in ’RV64IDC
Shellcoding in ’RV64IDC is more tricky. First of all, it requires the floating-
point unit (FPU) to be activated, which is always done by the operating
system when working in a hosted environment. In the context of the bare-
metal examples presented in this paper, we use a small additional piece of
non-alphanumeric code, whose sole purpose consists in activating the FPU
(in big-endian hexadecimal: 0x896373900330).
Similarly to /RV64IAC, the main difference lies in the way stage 2 is
unpacked by U1. This time, we store in the data-pool some floating-point
values which are used by U1 during unpacking. The most general floating-
point data manipulation instruction available is fmadd r, a, b, c (fused-
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multiply add): it computes r = a × b + c. The store operation fsd then
stores r at the desired memory location. We thus have to solve equations of
the form ri = ai × bi + ci, where ri is a small part of the decoded stage 2,
under the constraint that each ai, bi and ci need to be loaded from the data
pool. To keep our data pool as small as possible, we need to share values be-
tween different equations. As this increases the mathematical complexity of
solving floating-point equations, we decided to work on a simplified version
of the problem, in which we only encode 6 bytes of stage 2 into ri. Indeed, in
this way, the constraint lies only in the mantissa of the floating-point. Fur-
thermore, we fixed the two remaining bytes of ai, bi and ci to alphanumeric
constants which do not propagate carries to the exponent when performing
the operation. These simplifications turned out to be sufficient for solv-
ing the equations while reducing the total number of different floating-point
constants.
Hereafter, we present some of the methods we used for reducing the
number of different floating-point constants used. The first, consists in using
the same bi for all equations, as, without loss of generality, this does not
impedes finding a solution by just modifying ai and ci. This simplification
allows solving the equation by testing random alphanumeric values for ai,
computing the adequate ci then checking both ai and ci are alphanumeric.
A simple combinatorial analysis gives us the approximate probability that a
randomly chosen alphanumeric ai gives an alphanumeric solution for ci as:
( 62256)6 ' 150000 .
The second method consists in using the same ak for two consecutive
equations. Formally, we require to find solutions ak, c2k, c2k+1 for the fol-
lowing set of equations:
r2k = ak × b+ c2k
r2k+1 = ak × b+ c2k+1
Unfortunately, these equations are not guaranteed to always have so-
lutions. Indeed, let r2k and r2k+1 differ in their highest bit. This means
the highest bits of c2k and c2k+1 are different.2 Hence one of them is non-
alphanumeric. The solution we came up with consists in making stage 2
polymorphic, and trying to solve those equations for all instances of stage 2,
hoping to find one for which all the equations have a solution. The different
stage 2 instances are generated by either modifying the registers (150k vari-
ants), reordering some initialization instructions for the loop (6 variants), or
2We omit the rare and lucky case where carry propagation still provides a solution to
the equation.
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reordering the pointer increment instruction in the loop’s body (7 variants);
yielding a total of about 6 millions stage 2 instances.
Algorithm 1 uses memoization to speed up the resolution of equations.
In the worst case, the first loop has 12 million iterations (which can be
executed in parallel), the second has 4 iterations while the last has 2 million
iterations. In practice, when taking into account memoization, we counted
Input: b, a 64-bit floating-point value
Input: s0, ..., s2`+1, the stage 2
Result: a list of 64-bit floating-point values
mem := Array(None) ;
P := Polymorphism(s0, ..., s2`+1) ;
foreach r0, ..., r2`+1 in P do
for k = 0 to ` do
if mem[r2k][r2k+1] is not None then
continue
end
for i = 0 to 2000000 do
a := RandAlphanumFloatingPoint()
Solve c2k in
r2k = a× b+ c2k
Solve c2k+1 in
r2k+1 = a× b+ c2k+1
if c2k and c2k+1 are alphanumeric then
mem[r2k][r2k+1] := a
break
end
end
if mem[r2k][r2k+1] is None then
mem[r2k][r2k+1] := NotFound
end
end
if 6 ∃k,mem[r2k][r2k+1] is NotFound then
return (mem[r2k][r2k+1])(k=0..`)
end
end
Algorithm 1: Automated testing of the existence of a solution to the sets
of equations induced by a specific stage 2 encoding. The outer loop is
parallelized, testing several stage 2 instances concurrently.
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2.3× 1011 iterations, requiring 1.5 execution hours on a 4-core Atom 2GHz
CPU. Eventually, we found several instances for which all equations had
a solution. The rest of the shellcode is built in the same fashion as the
previous versions presented in the previous sections.
6 Evaluation
6.1 QEMU
We initially tested our 3 shellcodes on QEMU [5], a widespread open-source
emulator. It emulates a HiFive Unleashed RV64GC development board, with-
out some of its micro-architectural features like caches or timings. The
payload is expected to print “Hello world!” on the serial device mapped
at address 0x10013000. After generating the corresponding shellcodes for
#RV64IC, /RV64IAC and ’RV64IDC, we successfully managed to execute them
on QEMU. We provide in Appendix A the generated shellcodes, as well as
some instructions to easily reproduce this experiment.
6.2 HiFive Unleashed
Subsequently, we moved to a more realistic environment, including a Linux
operating system on a HiFive Unleashed board powered by a quad-core
Freedom U540 RV64GC processor. It features an off-the-shelf Fedora 28 stage
4 disk image in a buildroot chrooted environment, for which we created a
purposely vulnerable application executing its input data.
The first payload uses the write system call to print “Hello world!” on
the standard output. As previously, we generate the three different versions
of our shellcode, and successfully manage to execute them on the vulnerable
application. We successfully test the three shellcodes with two other pay-
loads, one that spawns a shell using the execve system call, and one that
prints on the standard output the contents of /etc/shadow file, using the
openat, read and write system calls.
As a side note, as the floating-point unit is activated by the operating
system, our ’RV64IDC shellcode does not require the non-alphanumeric pre-
viously described gadget anymore. Furthermore, we did not observe any
instruction cache issue, as one could dread when using self-modifying code.
This can be explained by the use of fence.i instructions that synchronize
the instruction cache.
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7 Conclusion and future work
We described a methodology for writing arbitrary alphanumeric (+1) RISC-
V shellcodes. This method relies on unpacking, in which a program written
in a very constrained instruction set stores into the memory another program
written in a less constrained instruction set. Here, we required two unpackers
in a three-staged shellcode to achieve arbitrary code execution. As a proof-
of-concept, we showed examples of such shellcodes for the HiFive Unleashed
board, featuring a standard Linux operating system. These positive results
validate our choice for unpacking methods as the most suitable solution to
the problem of writing executable code in a very constrained ISA subset.
Besides, the shellcodes provided in this paper only show proof-of-concept
attacks. With the wide adoption of RISC-V based devices, we expect the at-
tack surface to widen as new applications are published. Thereupon, we hope
to see adequate defense mechanisms being deployed on those platforms, pre-
venting such an attack. On the attacking side, automation seems the most
promising way of improvement. Indeed, shellcodes tend to be handwrit-
ten or automated using ad hoc algorithms. We believe that a more general
approach based on a higher-level semantic representation of the available
instructions may be able to comprehensively solve the problem of writing
code in a constrained ISA subset.
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A Hello World Shellcodes
We provide ready-to-use demo shellcodes, written respectively in #RV64IC,
/RV64IAC and ’RV64IDC. They print “Hello world!” on the serial output,
when executed on QEMU with the following command:
qemu-system-riscv64 -nographic -machine sifive_u
-device loader,file=shellcode.bin,addr=0x80000000
The notation (X)ˆ{Y} means that X is repeated Y times.
Colors have been added to each shellcode, with each color describing a
specific high-level operation described in section 5. The instructions that
jump over the encoded payload and put the location of the shellcode in sp
as described in section 5.1.1 are colored in red. The encoded payload is
in blue. Fixing-up the store pointer (section 5.1.2) is in cyan. Unpacking
the stage 2 (section 5.1.3) is in purple. The final nopsled is in brown. For
/RV64IAC and ’RV64IDC, additional data stored in the data pool is shown
in green. In /RV64IAC, some additional code is required to first store the
jump instruction (as shown in section 5.5) which is here in orange. Unused
parts of the shellcode are in black. Given that colors cannot be reproduced
in print, we refer the reader to the Arxiv version of this paper to that end.
A.1 #RV64IC QEMU Hello World
o#0# (BBBB)ˆ{1304} CGEDEDDDOEEDEEDDGEEE
ECEDGEEDEDLAKJDDDBDDEDDNCMCDDDDDGMCLCFFD
COBGEDDEGDCHCDDDALCDLMFHGDCHCDDDACOKEDAP
FLDLDDDDDDDDLPABHBHBKBHFDFCCKBFCHBbPEFND
DDDDBB (BBBB)ˆ{1377} 3Z0A3QCAyayayayaya
yayayayayayayayayayayayayayayaEcY3e##0ax
Aj#1Ay75v71J3SEAi##2ax7Eo91J3SEAY##3ax75
#zMJ3SEAM#y#y##4axQcY3E##5ax7ER81J3SEAY#
#6ax7Ej81J3SEAY##7ax75PP9J3ZEA#8Ay7#z81I
3Z#A#9AyAa75r05J3ZEA#2Ay7EBA9J3ZEA#3Ay7#
F#1Im93S#Au3#4ax7Ea85J3SEAY3#5ax7Up01J3Z
EA#6Ay759M5J3SEAi##7axAcy3e3#8axEcY3e##9
axAaAj#2Ay7#h91I3Z#A#3AyySySySySs0A4
23
A.2 /RV64IAC QEMU Hello World
ySySo/0/BBBBB03JBBBBBBBBBBBBBPCJ
(BBBB)ˆ{1955}
CGEDEDDDOEEDEEDDGEEEECEDGEEDEDLAKJDDDBDD
EDDNCMCDDDDDGMCLCFFDCOBGEDDEGDCHCDDDALCD
LMFHGDCHCDDDACOKEDAPFLDLDDDDDDDDLPABHBHB
KBHFDFCCKBFCHBbPEFNDDDDD (BBBB)ˆ{751}
3Y0A3Q/ABj/8Aa/8Aa1J3RHA3Z0A/0Ac/8AD//Aa
/2AA9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a
9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a3Z0A/0Ac/8AD75/AIJ3SEA13
1313//aDAa3Z0A/0Ac/8AD75xG1J3SEAi3//aDAa
3Z0A/0Ac/8AD7EqI1J3SEAY3//aDAa3Z0A/0Ac/8
AD7EpQ9J3ZEA//AAAa3Z0A/0Ac/8AD75gA9J3SEA
y3//aDAa3Z0A/0Ac/8AD7ETH1J3SEAY3//aDAa3Z
0A/0Ac/8AD7ElH1J3SEAY3//aDAa3Z0A/0Ac/8AD
75PP9J3ZEA//AAAa3Z0A/0Ac/8AD7/zH1I3Z/A//
AAAa3Z0A/0Ac/8AD75r05J3ZEA//AAAa3Z0A/0Ac
/8AD7EBA9J3ZEA//AAAa3Z0A/0Ac/8AD7/F/1Im9
3S/Au3//aDAa3Z0A/0Ac/8AD7Ea85J3SEAY3//aD
Aa3Z0A/0Ac/8AD7UpP1J3ZEA//AAAa3Z0A/0Ac/8
AD75aA1J3SEAY3A3//aDAa3Z0A/0Ac/8AD7///1I
a93S/AY3M31313//aDAa3Z0A/0Ac/8AD75/AIJ3S
EA131313//aDAa3Z0A/0Ac/8AD7/h91I3Z/A//AA
AaySySySySySySySs0A4
A.3 ’RV64IDC QEMU Hello World
\89\63\73\90\03\30
o’0’BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
BBBBBBBBBBBB3B1ozDaBBZzqspbBBBBBBBBBBBBB
BBBB64cinpaBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBug51zDaBVIQn
4f1A1nKj52aBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
BBBBphYdop1A9RlYo3aBPtIx’51AMKqGzV1ABBBB
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
BBBBUUUUUU1ALR5eFXcB (BBBB)ˆ{1177}
CGEDEDDDOEEDEEDDGEEEECEDGEEDEDLAKJDDDBDD
EDDNCMCDDDDDGMCLCFFDCOBGEDDEGDCHCDDDALCD
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LMFHGDCHCDDDACOKEDAPFLDLDDDDDDDDLPABHBHB
KBHFDFCCKBFCHBbPEFNDDDDDBB (BBBB)ˆ{1438}
3Z0A3QGAB5b6F’F8f4J9j1N2n3yayayayaya9a9a
9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9a9aC3A2’0azC3Ab’3
azG3Hr’6azG3HB’9azAa07X3L7G3IR’4azG3Ib’7
azG3GZ’9azs0A4
B Source code
The full source code used for this paper is available at:
https://xn--fda.fr/riscv-alphanumeric-shellcoding
and
https://github.com/RischardV/riscv-alphanumeric-shellcoding.
It contains all demos and tools used for this paper.
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